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Prospects for Structural Reform of
The Bankruptcy System
Marjorie Girtht
Professor Girth compares and evaluates the three major proposals for
structural reform of the bankruptcy system. The analysis is focused
on the potential impact of the proposed revisions on the bankruptcy
caseload, and on the relative efficiencies of the alternative proposals.
The Article concludes with a discussion of some obstacles to reform
of the system.
Congress is presently considering the possibility of structural re-
form for the processes of handling bankruptcy cases in this country.
Major revision of the Bankruptcy Act' has not occurred since 1938 and
the several suggestions for reform indicate that a substantial change is
overdue.2 This Article analyzes the three major proposals for possible
revisions of the bankruptcy system. It then assesses the impact of the
proposed revisions on the bankruptcy caseload and concludes with a
discussion of the current obstacles to structural bankruptcy reform.
I
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REVISION OF THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS
Three proposals for revision of the bankruptcy system are being
considered by Congress. Each of them attempts basic structural changes
which distinguish these proposals from substantive and procedural
amendments enacted since 1938. The proposals themselves differ
t Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B.
1959, Mt. Holyoke; LL.B. 1962, Harvard. Professor Girth is a co-author of the Brook-
ings Institution study of bankruptcy administration, D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANK-
E yIPC: PRoBLEm, PRocEss, REF R (1971). The author wishes to thank her col-
league John A. Spanogle, Jr. for encouraging her efforts on this Article.
1. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by the Chand-
ler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883. The Bankruptcy Act is codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1 et seq. (1970).
2. Reform legislation was originally introduced in October, 1973. See note 4
infra. Two years later, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees are making very
slow progress toward legislative enactments. Hearings are now scheduled for completion
in 1976. Letter from Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Con-
stitutional Rights, U.S. House Judiciary Committee, to author, July 24, 1975.
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largely in the structures which they recommend, while reflecting
greater agreement on substantive changes.3 This section summarizes
the structural provisions of the three proposals.
A. The Presidential Commission's Bill
This legislation [hereinafter called the Commission Bill] resulted
from the work of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States. 4 The Commission began its work in light of widespread
agreement that the present structure for handling bankruptcy cases was
seriously outmoded. 5 This consensus, however, did not survive the artic-
ulation of the Commission's suggested solution, which was to separate
the "administrative" and "judicial" functions presently performed by the
bankruptcy judges." Specifically, the Commission proposed the creation
of two new entitites: (1) the United States Bankruptcy Courts;7 and
(2) the United States Bankruptcy Administration.8
The Bankruptcy Administration would be an independent agency
within the executive branch of the federal government. All bankruptcy
petitions except those for railroad reorganizations, but including those
for the reorganization procedures which merged the provisions of chap-
ters X, X, and XII of the present Bankruptcy Act, would be filed with
this agency.' The new bankruptcy court would serve two main func-
tions: (1) the initial step for review from decisions made within the
3. This Article does not attempt a definitive analysis of the substantive proposals,
but it uses them to illustrate the impact of the proposed structural changes.
4. Congress authorized the commission in 1970. It completed work in July 1973.
See Kennedy, Foreword, Bankruptcy Reform-1973, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381-87
(1973) (Professor Kennedy was the Executive Director of the Commission). This ver-
sion of the proposed bankruptcy act was first introduced as H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). It was then reintroduced as
H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [herein-
after cited as the Commission Bill]. A second bankruptcy bill pending, H.R. 32, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), is commonly referred
to as the Judges' Bill. The pertinent provisions of the Judges' Bill are summarized in
Part I section C infra.
5. Cyr, Chapter XIII and the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States: A Time of Reckoning, 75 CoM. LJ. 385 (1970). Similar concerns were stated
in the statute which authorized the Commission, Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
354, 84 Stat. 468.
6. REPORT OF THE CoMMIssION ON THE BANKRuPTcy LAWS OF TIm UNITED
STATES, PART I, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5-8 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT: PART 1].
7. Commission Bill §§ 2-101 et seq. Judge Edward Weinfeld dissented from the
portion of the commission report which recommended the creation of the separate sys-
tem of bankruptcy courts, preferring instead to retain the current system for handling
judicial functions. REPORT: PART I, at 299-301.
8. Commission Bill §§ 3-101 et seq.
9. Id. §§ 4-202(b), 4-207(b), 9-202(b), 9-204(b).
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agency;' 0 and (2) the initial trial forum for certain issues, such as
objections to discharge." Issues appealed from the bankruptcy court
would be heard successively in the local United States District Court, the
appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme
Court. 2
The structural division attempted to meet two long-standing criti-
cisms of the present system. The first charged that bankruptcy judges
intimately involved in the administration of cases could not be objective
when they had to decide litigated issues.' 8 Second, it seemed more
efficient to separate people who were "selected and compensated for
judicial responsibilities" from those who handle administrative details
demanding lesser skills.' 4
The effort to separate "administrative" from "judicial" duties inevi-
tably made the Commission's report subject to criticism for improper
classification.' 5 The Commission seemed to feel that the existence of
assets beyond those necessary to pay administrative expenses turned a
case into one requiring "a judicial setting" even if no dispute arose.' 0 It
also concluded that even the most routine dispute required resolution in
a bankruptcy courtYT Thus, uncontested decisions were perceived as
resulting from administrative duties, unless those decisions were made in
cases which ultimately resulted in payments to creditors. Despite these
classification problems, enactment of the Commission Bill would be an
important reform because many uncontested cases could be processed
without court intervention.18
Several other important features of the Commission's structural
proposals should be mentioned. The Commission Bill provides for
expansion of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to include all
controversies arising out of a bankruptcy case.19 Thus, the opportunity
10. For examples, see id. §§ 4-101, 2-205(a).
11. Id. § 4-505(b).
12. Id. § 2-210.
13. REPORT, PAR.T I, at 5-6; 93-94.
14. Kennedy, Restructuring Bankruptcy Administration: The Proposals of the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, 30 Bus. LAw. 399, 400-01 (1975).
15. Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill for
the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM. BtAwm. LJ. 1, 6-7 (1975). The Com-
mission itself had been critical of an internal survey performed at the request of the
Administrative Office of the Courts. The survey had asked the bankruptcy judges what
proportions of their own time were consumed by administrative and judicial tasks. RE-
PoRT: PART I, at 5, 135-36.
16. REPORT: PART I, at 85-86. For data on the insignificant size of "asset" cases,
see text accompanying notes 62 to 69 infra.
17. REPoRT: PART I, at 86-87.
18. The Uniform Probate Code's system of "flexible administration" is based upon
a very similar proposaL See UNIFORM PROBATE CoDn §§ 3-301 to 3-311 (1974).
19. Commission Bill § 2-201.
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to delay bankruptcy proceedings by alleging that the bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction over a particular issue would be greatly reduced.20
The Commission also recommended a change in the procedure for
appointment of bankruptcy judges to one requiring nominations by the
President and confirmation by the Senate for terms of 15 years. 1
The Commission's proposal also benefits petitioners by providing
for broader powers for government employees. It allows agency staff to
counsel debtors with regular income concerning the kinds of relief
available under the statute.22 The administrator would also be author-
ized to serve as trustee in the proceeding unless creditors request a
meeting for the purpose of electing a trustee, or unless the debtor's
business is to be operated.23 This greater use of salaried personnel
should reduce the time necessary to complete the administration of a
bankruptcy case.24
Financing of the bankruptcy process constitutes another area ripe
for structural reform. The Commission attempts to create separate fi-
nancing systems for its administrative and judicial structures. The bank-
rutpcy courts would be publicly financed from general appropriations.2"
To finance the agency, the Commission would shift to a more complicat-
ed formula: expenses would be paid from fees and charges, estimated
at a level which would approximate costs, 28 earnings from funds in-
vested in proposed Chapter VI proceedings, 27 and congressional appro-
priations.28
B. The Brookings Proposal
Serious concern about the bankruptcy system had antedated the
creation of the Presidential Commission. In the early 1960's, representa-
tives of the federal courts had asked the Brookings Institution to consid-
20. REPORT: PART I, at 89-92.
21. Commission Bill § 2-102; REPoRT: PART I, at 6, 95. The Commission recom-
mends this change in appointment procedure because it considers its proposed Bank-
ruptcy Court as analogous to the Tax Court. For a discussion of the inappropriateness
of the analogy, see Testimony presented on September 19, 1975, before the Subcommit-
tee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee by Mar-
jorie Girth and David T. Stanley, at 9, 14-15 [hereinafter cited as Girth & Stanley Testi-
mony].
22. Commission Bill § 4-203(1) (a).
23. Id. § 5-101.
24. REPORT: PART I, at 123-24.
25. Commission Bill § 2-107; REPORT: PART I, at 134-35.
26. Commission Bill § 3-302.
27. Chapter VI is the counterpart to the present Chapter XIII in which wage-
earning bankrupts can propose to pay their debts over an extended period of time, pos-
sibly in a reduced amount. See id. § 3-303.
2R. 7d § 3-301(b).
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er undertaking a nationwide survey of bankruptcy operations. Funding
was obtained from the Ford Foundation, and the Brookings staff selected
eight federal judicial districts as representative of the various kinds of
caseload which bankruptcy judges handled.
The Brookings authors interviewed approximately 600 participants
in bankruptcy cases. In addition, almost 1,700 bankruptcy files were
examined, 400 personal bankrupts were interviewed, and the Gallup
Organization polled the public on their knowledge and attitudes about
bankruptcy.2 9
The resulting study recommended reform of the entire structure for
handling bankruptcy cases. It found that bankruptcy cases had potential
for litigation, but in the overwhelming proportion of cases, neither
creditors nor debtors found it worthwhile to litigate. By the time an
individual or a business decides to use the bankruptcy remedy, its assets
have dwindled to a point at which successful litigation might cost more
than it would yield.30 Spectacular exceptions to this general rule exist, 3'
but the Brookings authors felt that a reformed bankruptcy system could
be designed for the typical case without sacrificing the capacity for more
complex processing in those exceptional cases in which the parties felt it
worthwhile to pursue an issue.
Since the overwhelming proportion of bankruptcy cases require
only administrative processing, the Brookings study recommended the
establishment of an independent bankruptcy agency within the executive
branch. 2 Originally, all cases except corporate reorganizations were to
be filed with the agency, 3 but the Commission's report was convincing
in its recommendation that all cases except railroad reorganizations be
filed with the agency.3
The revised recommendation would require that agency personnel
process all cases, unless those filed as business reorganizations were
transferred to the United States District Court pursuant to an opting-out
procedure.35 Contested matters would be heard by administrative law
29. For details of the methodology, see D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRPtTCY:
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (1971), Apps. A-1 to A-4, B-1 [hereinafter cited as D.
SrTANLEY & M. GmTm].
30. Id. at 77; see text accompanying notes 62-71 and 87-88 infra.
31. Note that the percentage of business reorganization and arrangement cases did
not exceed two percent of the total bankruptcy caseload in fiscal years 1970 through
1975. See text accompanying notes 59-60 infra.
32. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH 199.
33. Id. at 212. Corporate reorganizations were to be filed with the U.S. District
Courts. The study did not deal with Ch. IX or Section 77 proceedings. Id. at 196.
34. See note 9 supra.
35. Compare Commission Bill §§ 7-101 and 7-102, which allow the administrator
or any party in interest to petition the court to intervene in the reorganization by order-
ing the administrator to add representative members to creditors' committees and by or-
[Vol. 63:15461550
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judges, whose decisions could be appealed to a central appeals board
within the agency and then to the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals,
before reaching the United States Supreme Court. 6 The proposed agen-
cy structure thus avoids the classification problems that the Commis-
sion's proposal encountered.
Agency personnel would be salaried and all except the director,
deputy director, attorneys, and specialists needed on an ad hoc basis
would be subject to civil service rules.3 7 As in the Commission's propos-
al, trained staff would be available to counsel the debtor on the options
which were available under the statute. The agency would also have
financial counseling staff, who would be available to the debtor as long
as the case was pending. Under these circumstances, some individual
debtors might decide not to use counsel, although the option would
remain open to them to do so if they wished."'
The Brookings authors also decided that the entire system should
be financed from general tax revenues.8 9 This decision was based upon
their perception of bankruptcy as a service to debtors in trouble, whose
financial rehabilitation would benefit a broader public than the immedi-
ate parties.40
C. The "Judges' Bill"
Although bankruptcy judges were not represented on the Commis-
sion itself,41 their views have not gone unheard. After reviewing the
Commission's proposed statute, the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges decided to draft its own revisions to the present Bankruptcy
Act.42 The judges' alternative legislative proposal has focused attention
dering the administrator to appoint a trustee, subject to the court's approval. See also
Girth & Stanley Testimony, supra note 21, at 25-26.
36. D. STANLEY & M. GmTH 215.
37. Id. at 203-04.
38. Id. at 204-05.
39. Id. at 214. Nominal filing fees would provide some revenue.
40. After considering the Commission's recommendations, the Brookings authors
continue to feel that the system should be publicly financed. One possible alternative
would be to publicly-finance liquidation proceedings, and then charge the costs of per-
sonal or business payout plans against creditors participating in those cases. This would
extend the Commission's proposals under Commission Bill § 3-302 to their Chapter VII
proceedings. The need for public funds could also be reduced by the amount of earnings
from invested funds of all bankruptcy estates. See Girth & Stanley Testimony, supra
note 21, at 17-18.
41. For a history of the elimination of the requirement that bankruptcy judges be
included on the Commission, see Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive
Revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 102-07 (1975).
42. This legislation was first introduced in 1974; it was reintroduced in January,
1975 as H.R. 32 and S. 235, respectively, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited
as the Judges' Bill].
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on their recommendations to a greater extent than a minority position
on the Commission might have achieved.
The Judges' Bill includes a number of the substantive reforms
which the Commission proposed. The judges' structural recommenda-
tions, however, only complete the process of enhancing the status of
the former bankruptcy referee. 3 They now recommend creation of a
"one-stop, full-service bankruptcy court,"" with law clerks, criers, and
bailiffs, among other subsidiary personnel .4  Appeals from such courts
would go directly to the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals and then
to the United States Supreme Court."
The concept of the full-service court avoids the Commission's
classification problems. All bankruptcy petitions, including distinct peti-
tions for business "arrangement" and "reorganization" proceedings,
would be filed with the court.47 The bankruptcy court would have the
enlarged jurisdiction recommended by the Commission.4 The bank-
ruptcy judges would have 15-year terms, as in the Commission Bill, but
appointing authority would be lodged in the Judicial Council of the
appropriate circuit."
The Judges' Bill also includes a proposal to establish the Branch of
Bankruptcy Administration within the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.50 However, the role foreseen for the Branch is
much more limited than that proposed by the Commission for the
bankruptcy agency.5' For example, the Branch could help a person who
is considering bankruptcy prepare a petition and statement of affairs, 2
but no counseling facilities would be available within the Administrative
Office. Instead, the judges' proposal provides for the Director to main-
tain a list of attorneys for individual referrals.5 3
The judges' proposals for financing the bankruptcy system provide
more systematic reform than do the Commission's. Financing from
43. In 1973 bankruptcy referees attained the title of "bankruptcy judges." BAwl-
RUPTCY RULES § 901(7) (1973) (effective October 1, 1973).
44. Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill for
the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM. BANER. L.J. 1, 6 (1975); Judges' Bill
§§ 2-101 et seq.
45. Judges' Bill § 2-106.
46. Id. § 2-209.
47. Id. §§ 4-202(b) and 4-207(b). For the Commission's proposal, see note 9
supra. The "arrangement" and "reorganization" procedures are found in Chapters VIII
and VII, respectively, of the Judges' Bill.
48. Judges' Bill § 2-201.
49. Id. § 2-102.
50. Id. § 1-102(5). The funding provision is section 3-101. For an analysis of
the origins and limited powers of the Administrative Office, see P. FisH, THE POLMTCS
OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINIsTRATION, Chs. 4-6 (1973).
51. Lee, supra note 44, at 9-12.
52. Judges' Bill § 4-203(a).
53. Id. § 4-203(b) and (c).
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general appropriations is recommended for the bankruptcy courts and
their supporting personnel,5 4 a much more significant recommendation
than the Commission's because it covers virtually the entire system.
Congressional appropriations are also authorized for the Branch of
Bankruptcy Administration. 5 In addition, the Director of the Adminis-
trative Office is authorized to establish filing fees and charges, based
upon a standard of "reasonable and equitable" levels, 6 not the estimat-
ed actual cost standard proposed by the Commission. The judges also
adopt the Commission's proposal that earnings from investments of
Chapter VI estates be forwarded to the federal treasury.57
11
CASELOAD WHICH A REVISED BANKRUPTCY
STRUCTURE WOULD HANDLE
Neither the Presidential Commission nor the bankruptcy judges
made an independent factual assessment of the activity within the
current bankruptcy caseload. Neither they nor anyone else disputed the
Brookings factual findings on the personal and financial profiles of the
petitioners and on the kinds of activity which occurred as the cases were
processed.
The experience of the last 5 years, which is summarized in the table
following, shows that personal bankruptcy cases continue to constitute
an overwhelming proportion of the bankruptcy caseload, although the
percentage of business cases has increased slightly:5"
Bankruptcy Filings
Fiscal Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Personal
Filings 178,202 182,249 164,737 155,707 168,706 224,354
Percent
of total 91.7% 90.5% 90.0% 89.9% 89.0% 88.2%
Business
Filings 16,197 19,103 18,132 17,490 20,807 30,130
Percent
of total 8.3% 9.5% 10.8% 10.1% 11.0% 11.8%
Total
Filings 194,399 201,352 182,869 173,197 189,513 254,484
Source: DnIEcToR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTs
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES (1975).
During the same period, Chapter XI filings for business arrangements
54. Id. § 2-107.
55. Id. § 3-101.
56. Id. § 3-102.
57. Id. § 3-103(b).
58. For earlier years, see D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 29, at 107.
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did not exceed 1.4 percent of the total bankruptcy caseload," and the
total of all other business reorganizations and arrangements did not
exceed 0.2 percent of the total bankruptcy caseload 0 These statistics
emphasize how inappropriate it would be to force 98 percent of the
petitioners into a structure emphasizing the needs of less than 2 percent
of the caseload. 61
Although the Brookings data should have destroyed some myths
about the asset values of business bankruptcy liquidations, some precon-
ceptions linger. After the Commission's report was completed, Professor
Kennedy wrote that "[business bankruptcies are typically asset bank-
ruptcies .... -62 This ignores the fact that 31 percent of the business
liquidation cases in the Brookings sample had no assets and an addition-
al 13 percent paid only administrative expenses. Consequently, only 56
percent of the business liquidations were "asset cases," and the median
size of such estates was a mere $3190.118 Costs of administration aver-
aged 29.3 percent in the Brookings asset cases, 4 and would total $935
in the median business asset case. If no creditors were entitled to priority
of payment under the present statute, 5 unsecured creditors would share
$2255, an amount which would not be likely to encourage litigation.
Readers should recall that business asset liquidations would total
only 5 to 6 percent of the total bankruptcy caseload.0 6 If the new
structure emphasized business asset liquidations, arrangements, and re-
organizations, 7 the reformed structure would be designed for only ap-
59. 0.6 percent in Fiscal Year 1970; 0.9 percent in Fiscal Year 1971; 0.7 percent
in Fiscal Year 1972; 0.8 percent in Fiscal Year 1973; 1.2 percent in Fiscal Year 1974;
and 1.4 percent in Fiscal Year 1975. DnFcro oF THE ADMINISTRATWE OFFICE OF THS
UNirED STATES CoURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES - (1975).
60. 0.09 percent in Fiscal Year 1970; 0.1 percent in Fiscal Years 1971 through
1973; and 0.2 percent in Fiscal Years 1974 and 1975. 7d.
61. This article does not attempt to deal extensively with the substantive or pro-
cedural issues involving reorganizations. That aspect of the debate is pursued in Wein-
traub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) as Proposed By The Bankruptcy Com-
mission: The Widening Gap Between Theory And Reality, 47 Am. BAHKR. ,.J. 323
(1973); Trost, Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter I of the "Bankruptcy Act
of 1973": Another View, 48 AM. BNK'R. L.J. 111 (1974); and Brudney, The Bankruptcy
Commission's Proposed "Modification" of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 Am. BANKR.
LJ. 305 (1974).
62. Kennedy, The Report of the Bankruptcy Commission: The First Five Chap-
ters of the Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, 49 IND. L.J. 422, 430 (1974).
63. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 29, at 127. The Administrative Office
does not maintain data on the asset status of business and personal bankruptcy cases,
so this information cannot be updated from published information.
64. Id. at 177.
65. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
66. This is 56 percent of the percentage of business filings for each year. See
the table following text at note 58 supra.
67. One commentator does suggest that the structure for bankruptcy cases divide
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proximately 8 percent of its total volume. Once again, the Brookings
authors felt that the reformed structure should not be designed specifi-
cally for such a small portion of the overall bankruptcy caseload.
The frequency and size of asset cases in the personal bankruptcy
liquidation sample were even lower than the corresponding figures for
business liquidations. Sixty-four percent of the personal bankruptcy
liquidation cases had no assets. Another 20 percent paid only ad-
ministrative expenses. The 16 percent which were asset cases had a
median size of $311. Subtracting the 29.3 percent average administra-
tive cost of $91 left creditors with only $220.68 The median size of non-
business arrangement cases under Chapter XIII was $600.69
Not surprisingly, a caseload reflecting these low asset values did
not generate much litigation. For example, objections to claims were
filed in less than 10 percent of the cases. 70 Such objections usually only
require that the creditor substantiate its claims, normally through ac-
counting records. Objections to discharge, also very infrequent, were
filed in only 4 percent of each of the non-business and non-corporate
business samples. Only one business bankrupt and less than 1 percent of
the personal bankrupts actually had their discharges denied. 71
The precise impact that major substantive reforms may have on the
size and composition of the caseload cannot be accurately predicted.
One can, however, point to specific provisions which would affect the
caseload. Those likely to decrease litigation include the following:
(1) The proposal to expand the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts.72 As indicated above, this provision will reduce litigation con-
cerning the propriety of the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction.
(2) Uniform federal exemptions, recommended by the Commis-
sion.7' This proposal combines uniformity and higher valuations for
consumer from business cases, reserving the bankruptcy courts for the latter. Phelan,
The Proposed Bankruptcy Administration (The "FBA")-Bureaucratic Alphabet Soup
Gets A Bigger Bowl, 48 AM. BAx. L.I. 341, 342-45 (1974).
68. D. STANLEY & M. GlTI-, supra note 29, at 88.
69. Id. at 102.
70. These cases included three percent of the personal bankruptcy liquidations,
and 31 percent of the business bankruptcy liquidations. For arrangement proceedings
creditors' stakes and the incidence of objections was understandably higher, involving
9 percent of Chapter XII's and three-quarters of the Chapter XI's. D. STANLEY & M.
GmiTH, supra note 29, at 89, 98, 128, 137.
71. Id. at 91, 129. Other details on litigation activity can be found at 77-91, 94-
103, 121-29, 134-41.
72. Section 2-201 of both the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill, discussed at
text accompanying notes 19-20 and note 48 supra, respectively. The Brookings authors
also favor the comprehensive grant of jurisdiction, but they would have Congress make
that grant to their proposed agency. See Girth & Stanley, Testimony, supra note 21,
at 13-14.
73. Commission Bill § 4-503.
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exempt property compared to most current state laws. The latter factor
should deter debtors from understating the value of their property and
reduce creditors' incentives to challenge the stated values.7 4 The
Judges' Bill would establish uniform minimum federal exemptions, but
would allow the states to be more generous.75
(3) The removal of the alleged false financial statement as an
exception to dischargeability in non-business cases. 76 Citing a creditor's
enormous "leverage" when it had obtained a financial statement from a
consumer, the Commission decided that "exploitation" via settlements
or reaffirmations could be eliminated only by removing this exception to
dischargeability. 77 The Brookings study goes even further in recom-
mending the elimination of all exceptions to dischargeability other than
alimony, support, and unscheduled debts of creditors who did not have
notice of the bankruptcy proceedings. 78
(4) Removal of the necessity of proving that a creditor who
received an alleged "preference '79 within 3 months of the filing
of the petition had "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is
insolvent. '80 "Reasonable cause to believe" is measured as of the time
the transfer or payment was made,8 1 and is very difficult to prove.
Examples of proposed revisions which might increase litigation
include the following:
(1) The provision that one creditor with a $2500 unsecured claim
may file an involuntary petition against an alleged bankrupt.8 2 Since the
creditor could now act on its own, more "nuisance" filings may occur,
resulting in more contested hearings.
74. Allowed exemptions varied from those which had been claimed in 29 percent
of the cases in the Brookings study. D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, supra note 29, at 83.
75. Judges' Bill § 4-503. The Brookings authors prefer that an aggregate mini-
mum dollar value be set for all property other than realty, rather than minima for partic-
ular types of property. See Girth & Stanley, Testimony, supra note 21, at 22-23.
76. Commission Bill § 4-507(a).,
77. Kennedy, supra note 62, at 429 n.55.
78. D. STANLEY & M. GranH, supra note 29, at 208.
79. A "preference" is a transfer or payment on account of an antecedent debt, re-
ceived by a creditor whose position vis a vis the other creditors who share its status
would thereby be improved. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970)
(makes such transfers within four months of bankruptcy vulnerable to attack).
80. Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970). Section 4-607 of both
the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill require such proof only if the creditor is per-
sonally related to the petitioner or if the creditor was "a partner, an affiliate, a director,
an officer, or a managing agent of or for the debtor" and payments to the creditor had
occurred between 3 months and 1 year before the filing.
81. Id.
82. Commission Bill § 4-205(a); Judges' Bill § 4-205(a). A counterpart provi-
sion for filing involuntary corporate reorganizations appears in § 4-205(b) of both bills.
Compare Bankruptcy Act § 59(b), 11 U.S.C. § 95(b) (1970), which requires three or
more creditors with unsecured claims totalling $500 before an involuntary petition can
be filed.
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(2) The proposal that an "unconscionable consumer claim" would
be disallowed.83
(3) The addition of a category of claims arising within 90 days of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition to those which would be excepted
from discharge if the petitioner incurred the debt "without the intention,
at the time it was incurred, to pay the debt and in contemplation of the
filing of a petition under this title.'" 4 If this section were enacted,
problems of proof would be comparable to those eliminated in the
preference section.
(4) The proposal that changes in the values of collateral under
"blanket" security interests be used to determine whether a preference
had occurred.8c A trustee under the proposed revision could argue that a
preference had occurred if the value of the collateral at the time of the
bankruptcy filing was higher than it had been at the beginning of
preference period."6
Nothing about any of these proposed substantive changes would
produce an increase in the asset values of estates which are being
administered under the bankruptcy system, and increased exemptions
might even decrease such values.8 7 Creditors will continue to ask "is it
worth it?" before deciding to litigate. Without increased asset values,
their answer will usually be negative.8
The proposed structural revisions may be assessed more generally
from varying perspectives:
(1) Value of litigation. This factor would probably be independent
of the bankruptcy system's structural setting. Such a lack of potential
impact may be used as an argument for maintaining the status quo. But
it makes an irrelevant comparison between levels of litigation under the
present and proposed structures in a system in which most cases involve
no litigation at all.
83. Commission Bill § 4-403(b)(8). Section 4-403(b) (8) of the Judges' Bill does
not limit unconscionability to consumer claims. The Brookings authors would also add
a category of "improvident" claims to those which might be disallowed. See Girth &
Stanley Testimony, supra note 21, at 23-24.
84. Commission Bill § 4-506(a) (3); Judges' Bill § 4-506(a) (3). The Brookings
authors oppose the enactment of this section. See Girth & Stanley Testimony, supra
note 21, at 21-22.
85. UNEFORM COMMERCIAl. CODE § 9-204(3) (1962 version) authorizes the crea-
tion of the so-called "floating lien."
86. Commission Bill § 4-607(d) (1); Judges' Bill § 4-607(d) (1).
87. Even if more consumer filings resulted because of a combination of increased
exemptions and decreased exceptions to dischargeability, the Commission agreed with
the Brookings study that there would be no threat to the economy. Kennedy, Reflec-
tions on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W.
VA. L. REv. 427, 436-37 (1974); D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, supra note 29, at 39-40.
88. Evidence of creditor disinterest permeated the findings of the Brookings study.
See, e.g., D. SrANL.n & M. GrRT, supra note 29, at 76-77, 121-22.
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(2) Frequency of rehabilitation. The structural alternatives' impact
on the frequency of rehabilitation would provide a more relevant stan-
dard for comparison. The present structure does nothing in bankruptcy
liquidations beyond the possibility that obtaining a discharge gives the
debtor "a fresh start." The judges' proposed system also claims to do
nothing more about rehabilitation in liquidation cases than to maintain a
referral list of attorneys to whom potential bankrupts could be sent.""
The Brookings study had found that the attorneys' and judges'
attitudes toward personal bankruptcy options seriously limited the effec-
tive choices of non-business bankrupts. 90 To alleviate this problem, the
Commission Bill provides for agency counseling of the petitioner as to
options under the statute.9 1 The Brookings proposal also would add
financial counseling for the petitioners. Agency staff would provide such
counseling as long as the bankruptcy case was pending.2
(3) Dislocation of bankruptcy personnel. The proposed structural
revisions should also be assessed in terms of their ability to protect the
present participants in the system. The Judges' Bill would not only
protect the current bankruptcy judges, but would enhance their status. 3
The Commission Bill would preserve the status of the "judicial" activity
which remains under its classifications. But by requiring that all cases be
filed with the agency, the Commission's proposal provides the opportu-
nity for the overwhelming proportion of the caseload to be processed in
a non-adversary setting.
The Brookings proposal constitutes the most serious threat to the
present managers of the bankruptcy system. Since there would be no
bankruptcy court, the jobs of the present bankruptcy judges would be
eliminated, although some of them could become administrative law
judges within the proposed agency.9 4 The proposal also explicitly notes
the possibility that some non-business bankrupts might decide not to use
attorneys. 5 Moreover, attorneys who are presently serving as receivers
and trustees would be replaced by salaried personnel.
CONCLUSION
Several factors have combined to slow congressional progress on
structural bankruptcy reform. First, bankruptcy reform has not become
89. Judges' Bill § 4-203(c). If a debtor with regular income elects to proceed
under Chapter VI, the trustee is also required to "counsel the debtor in the performance
of the plan." Id. § 6-101 (c) (5).
90. D. STANLEY & M. GiRTl, supra note 29, at 75-76.
91. Commission Bill § 4-203 (a).
92. D. STANLEY & M. GmTI, supra note 29, at 204-05.
93. See text accompanying notes 41-49 supra.
94. D. STANLEY & M. GmT, supra note 29, at 216.
95. See note 38 supra and the accompanying text.
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a broad-based public issue. Bankrupts are not a well-organized or vocal
constituency. Nor does the general public evince as much concern about
bankruptcy as it does about other legal issues which affect larger groups
of the populace. Such issues include probate procedures, the possibility
of injury or property damage from an automobile accident, and di-
vorce.9 6 Although bankruptcies exceeded 250,000 case filings for fiscal
year 197 5,97 debtors' family members would only total approximately
one million if each individual bankrupt had four dependents. 8
A second factor contributing to congressional lethargy is the fact
that creditors have not demanded structural bankruptcy reform. In
calendar year 1974, consumers repaid $157.1 billion in installment
debt." By comparison, discharged debts in bankruptcy proceedings
seem insignficant. For fiscal 1968, the Brookings authors estimated that
the total debt discharged was roughly $2 billion.100 Increasing that
figure by 41 percent, the rise in the Consumer Price Index between
1968 and June, 1974,101 brings the total of discharged debt to approx-
imately $3 billion, or less than 2 percent of the total consumer debt
repaid in 1974. In addition, creditors spread the cost of their bad debt
losses through credit insurance, tax deductions, and the higher costs of
goods or credit to those who do pay promptly.102
The alternative proposals for revision also fail to provide legislators
with the appealing argument that enactment would produce obvious
governmental economies. The Judges' Bill and the Brookings proposal
would finance almost all of the revised system out of general appropria-
tions. The Brookings Report in 1971 estimated the net cost of its
proposed system at $30.5 million, compared with an estimated cost of
the present system of $34.8 million, almost all of which was paid by
96. Bankruptcy reform proposals are most similar to the Uniform Probate Code's
system of informal probate administration, which allows estates to be distributed without
court intervention unless an interested party requests "supervised administration." See
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-301 to -311 and 3-501 (1974). But no fault divorce and
insurance reforms also reflect the public's lack of interest in litigating the issue of who
was at fault in creating the problem. See Zuckman, The ABA Family Law Section v.
The NCCUSL: Alienation, Separation and Forced Reconciliation over the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 24 CATH. L. Ruv. 61 (1974); Hart, National No-Fault Auto
Insurance: The People Need It Now, 21 CATs. L. REV. 259 (1972). The field of bank-
ruptcy reform is analogous to these other proposals for reform because most bankruptcy
cases do not involve litigation.
97. Filings for the fiscal year totaled 254,484, of which 224,354 were non-business
petitions. Data furnished by H. Kent Presson, Assistant Chief of the Bankruptcy Divi-
sion of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, September 5, 1975.
98. See D. STANLEY & M. GmRT, supra note 29, at 42, for a profile of the typical
personal bankrupt.
99. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PREsmNT, Table C-60, at 320 (1975).
100. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 29, App. B-2, at 232-33.
101. ECONOMIC REPORT OF Tm PRESIDENT, Table C-44, at 300 (1975).
102. See D. STANLEY & M. GmT, supra note 29, at 37-39.
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the parties to the proceedings. 08 The judges have not estimated a cost
figure for their proposed system, but it would obviously be at least as
expensive as the present system because of the recommended supporting
staff and facilitites.0 4 Bankrupts and their creditors, on the other hand,
would find the proceedings less costly if general appropriations were to
provide the basic funding for the system. However, the Commission's
financing proposal would require the parties to pay increased levels of
administrative costs if the agency were financed on a self-supporting
basis. 0 5
Finally, opponents of structural reform are much more effectively
organized than are its proponents. To date, the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges has been the most outspoken opponent, although it
claims reformist goals.'0 6 Before the Brookings Report was published,
some judges attempted to gain the initiative in the legislative debate by
making their own proposals. These included adding examiners to the
Administrative Office staff,1 7 adding social workers to the United States
District Courts' probation offices for counseling purposes,108 and ex-
panding the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts and providing more
adequate facilities, including courtroom space and libraries.'00
Only Judge Lee acknowledged that a more significant administra-
tive structure might emerge. He suggested the institution of an Official
Trustee within the judicial branch of government. This suggestion in-
cluded an option for creditors to elect a private trustee if they preferred
to do so. 10
After the Brookings Report was published, the strategy shifted to
personal attacks on its authors, coupled with applause for the newly-
promulgated bankruptcy rules."' The rules did improve the present
103. Id. at 188-90; App. B-6, at 24243; App. C-22 at 259.
104. See notes 45-46 supra and the accompanying text.
105. REPORT: PART I, at 150-53.
106. Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 99-101 (1975).
107. See Lee, Possible Alternatives to the Present System of Bankruptcy Adminis-
tration, 45 Am. BANKR. LJ. 149, 168-69 (1971). Effective in July, 1975, examiners
for the federal court system were added to the staff of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts. This change in budgetary appropriations was approved by both the United
States Judicial Conference and the Department of Justice, which will retain the examin-
ing function for the U.S. Attorneys' offices. Data furnished by William E. Foley, Dep-
uty Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, November 3, 1975.
108. Lee, The Counseling of Debtors in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 387, 399 (1971).
109. Cyr, Bankruptcy Courts in Transition Toward Debtor Rehabilitation, 22
MAINE L. REv. 333, 339, 358 (1970).
110. Lee, supra note 108, at 401. The creditors' option to elect a trustee now ap-
pears in § 5-101 of both the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill.
111. See Cyr, The Abandonment of Judicial Administration of Insolvency Proceed-
ings: A Commitment to Consumer Disservice, 78 CoM. L.I. 37, 38 (1973).
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system," 2 but they were not designed to preempt future congressional
judgments about the appropriate structure for administering the bank-
ruptcy caseload.
An effort was also made to characterize the Brookings Report as
an anti-consumer document,1 3 both in its structure and in its suggestion
that non-business bankrupts might decide not to use attorneys." 4 An-
other suggestion for the supplemental staffing of the present system also
emerged, namely that administrative assistants assigned to the present
bankruptcy judges could solve the system's problems."'
Once the Commissions Report was issued, the judges rapidly
shifted their attention from the Brookings authors to the Commissioners
and their staff."16 This time the opposition was combined with a more
positive strategy, that of drafting the Judges' Bill. In addition, the judges
provided a detailed comparison of their legislation and the Commis-
sion's.1 7
Other professional associations have so far played a limited role in
the bankruptcy reform process. At the American Bar Association's
annual convention in 1972, the Corporation, Business, and Banking
Law Section passed two resolutions for forwarding to the Presidential
Commission. One endorsed the concept of uniform federal exemptions.
The other urged that bankruptcy administration be retained in the
federal judicial system, but that it be reorganized to free the judges from
administrative tasks." 8 The Bankruptcy Committee of the Commercial
Law League has also had the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill
under extensive study and basically supports the Judges' Bill." 9 The
National Bankruptcy Conference is now completing its study of the
pending legislation and expects to present a report including legislative
amendments to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees within the
next few months. 20
112. See Lavien, Water a Myth and Watch It Growl, 79 CoM. L.J. 116, 118
(1974).
113. Cyr, supra note 111, at 40.
114. Levitt, Bankruptcy Administration and the Brookings Report-A Critical
Analysis, 77 Com. LJ. 179, 181 (1972).
115. Seidman, The Proposed New Bankruptcy Act-A Projection, 78 CoM. LJ.
254, 256 (1973). This Article is an edited version of a speech which Judge Seidman
gave before the Bankruptcy Commission's Report was issued.
116. Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 45 (1974).
117. See Lee, supra note 44.
118. Mimeo copies of the Resolutions, in the author's possession.
119. See Levit, Report of the Bankruptcy Committee of the Commercial Law
League of America on Proposed Revisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 80 CoM. L.J. 188
(1975). The report also included specific suggestions for improvements in the Judges'
Bill. The Committee report has been approved by the Board of Governors of the Com-
mercial Law League.
120. Telephone conversation with Professor Ven Countryman, Vice-Chairman of
the National Bankruptcy Conference, September 5, 1975.
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It is difficult to predict whether any of the current structural
proposals will survive the legislative process. Structural reform of the
bankruptcy system may not occur unless Congress perceives strong
public support. As congressional deliberations continue, observers will
be able to assess whether bankruptcy procedures are insulated from the
apparent public interest in less adversary settings for probate, accident,
and family law cases. If they are, the resulting structure will be a
significant exception to other legislative trends in the past 10 years.
